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ABSTRACT
Firm- and plant-level empirical studies typically find that trade liberalization squeezes price-
cost margins among import-competing firms, that this heightened competitive pressure induces
productivity gains among these same firms, and that further efficiency gains come from market share
reallocations. Using a computable industrial evolution model to simulate the dynamic effects of
import competition, we demonstrate what types of managerial behavior, long-term transition paths
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  Most students of economic development feel that liberal trade regimes are a good 
thing, and that the costs of protection can be substantial.  In significant part, this belief 
traces to the notion that foreign competition disciplines domestic firms, forcing them to 
eliminate waste, accelerate their innovation rates, or shut down. This “import discipline” 
notion traces, in turn, to numerous firm- and plant-level empirical studies of liberalization 
episodes. These conclude that the manufacturing sectors of developing countries have 
become more efficient after trade liberalization episodes, that this has been accomplished 
partly through producer turnover, and that heightened competitive pressure from imports 
has been the motivating force. 
Although the empirical literature that supports the import discipline hypothesis 
offers some robust findings, it leaves many basic issues unresolved. One source of 
ambiguity is that it is based on flawed measures of firm performance. But more 
fundamentally, this literature (a) fails to identify empirically the mechanisms that link 
import competition to efficiency, (b) only describes the short-run effects of trade 
liberalization, and (c) doesn’t translate firms’ performances into welfare measures. Our 
objective is to address these shortcomings. Using a computable industrial evolution 
model to simulate the dynamic effects of import competition, we demonstrate what types 
of managerial behavior, long-term transition paths, and welfare effects are consistent with 
the findings of previous firm- and plant-level empirical studies. 
Our analysis is based on a modified version of Pakes and Ericson’s (1995) and 
Pakes and McGuire’s (1994) modelhereafter, the PEM model. It describes an industry 
populated by a changing set of firms, each producing its own differentiated product. New 
  1firms enter the industry when the expected present value of their future earning stream 
exceeds their entry costs, and incumbent firms exit when the expected value of their 
future earnings stream falls below the scrap value of their assets. While active, firms can 
invest an amount of their choosing to increase the likelihood of a quality-improving 
product innovation. All economic agents make optimal choices, given their current 
information sets and the idiosyncratic shocks they experience. (Inter alia, these choices 
reflect accurate perceptions concerning the stochastic processes they optimize against and 
the behavior of their competitors.) We modify the PEM framework by introducing an 
imported product variety that competes with the domestically-produced varieties and 
increases in quality at an exogenous rate.  
Simulations of our version of the PEM model reproduce the well-known features 
of short-run adjustment to trade liberalization by import-competing sectors:  price-cost 
margins fall, and efficiency improves, largely because of the elimination of weak product 
lines and the exit of inefficient plants. But our results also demonstrate that the intra-
industry efficiency effects of foreign competition are probably more nuanced than 
commonly believed.  
Specifically, we find that productivity gains due to the purging of weak firms are 
transitory, and likely to dissipate within 10 to 15 years of trade liberalization. As they 
fade, the cumulative effects of reform-induced changes in the incentive to innovate 
become more important. These are often negative, so foreign competition can create a 
longer-term tendency for the quality of domestic goods to deteriorate relative to imports. 
Depending upon the nature of the trade reforms, this tendency may or may not be offset 
by quality/efficiency gains due to embodied technological progress in imported capital. In 
  2any case, heightened import competition is likely to be accompanied by permanently 
higher plant or product line turnover cum more rapid job creation and job destruction. 
Finally, there is a strong possibility of welfare losses on the part of domestic producers, 
but welfare gains among consumers due to lower prices are likely to be larger.  
 
II.  The Import Discipline Hypothesis 
Let us begin our discussion by recounting the logic behind the import discipline 
hypothesis, and the firm-level evidence that is often cited in its support.   
A.  Micro Foundations for the Trade-Efficiency Linkage 
A variety of theoretical arguments provide possible explanations for the import 
discipline hypothesis. Some of these apply to any policy reform that intensifies 
competitive pressures. For example, in contexts where ownership is separate from 
management, heightened competition can reduce agency problems, and thus may induce 
managers to move toward high-effort contracts (Hart, 1983; Voustden and Campbell, 
1994). This effect is quite sensitive to modeling assumptions, however, and might well go 
in the other direction (Scharfstein, 1988; Martin, 1993).  
Regardless of whether agency problems are present, competition may heighten 
incentives to innovate among those firms close to the technological frontier, while 
inducing the rest to forfeit market share and/or shut down. Boone (2000) defines 
heightened competitive pressure as a shock that induces this pattern of response, and 
provides some examples of demand systems and market equilibria that exhibit this 
property.
1 Of course, competitive pressures may serve mainly to reduce the rents from 
                                                 
1Aghion, et al (2003) develop a simple model with the same features. They posit that firms can improve 
their efficiency by no more than one unit per period, so firms that lag more than one unit behind the 
  3innovation, as Schumpeter argued, so these laudatory effects need not obtain. Aghion et 
al (2002) demonstrate that the relationship between product market competition and 
innovation might exhibit an inverted-U shape, reflecting the relative strength of 
Schumpeterian and Boone-type forces. 
Other linkages between openness and efficiency are inherently trade-related. For 
example, Melitz (forthcoming) and Bernard et al (forthcoming) demonstrate that by 
liberalizing trade, countries create new markets for their most efficient firms and new 
competition for the rest. Thus it is possible to generate efficiency enhancing market share 
reallocations without necessarily involving innovative activity. Trade flows may also act 
as a conduit for embodied or disembodied knowledge flows, and may (or may not) 
change the returns to innovation through general equilibrium effects on factor prices and 
market sizes (Grossman and Helpman, 1991). 
 
B.  The existing evidence 
Given the widespread appeal of import discipline arguments, and given the many 
possible forms they might take, the profession has looked to empiricists to document their 
nature and measure their importance. Two developments during the past quarter-century 
have made it possible for the empiricists to respond in force. One is that numerous plant 
and firm-level data sets have accumulated over sufficient time spans to support 
econometric inference. The other is that many developing countries have dramatically 
liberalized their trade regimes, generating a number of natural experiments.  
                                                                                                                                                 
technological frontier have no chance of catching up. With homogeneous products and Bertrand 
competition, the threat of competition from an efficient foreign supplier induces firms one step behind to 
invest in innovations, and induces those further back to relinquish their market. 
  4At least five such natural experiments have attracted attention from empiricists. 
One of the earliest occurred in Chile, which went from widespread quantitative 
restrictions and average effective protection rates over 100 percent in 1967 to virtually no 
quantitative restrictions and average effective protection rates of 15 percent by 1979 
(Tybout, et al, 1991). Next, Mexico went from license coverage ratios of 91 percent and 
tariff-based effective protection rates of 31 percent in 1984 to license coverage ratios of 
11 percent and effective protection rates of 9 percent in 1990 (Tybout and Westbrook, 
1995). The Cote d’Ivoire also began its liberalization in 1985, removing quantitative 
restrictions, and reducing average tariffs by 30 percent over the following 2 years 
(Harrison, 1994).  More recently, Brazil reduced its exchange rate-adjusted average 
nominal tariff rate from 80 percent in 1985 to 21 percent in 1995, simultaneously 
eliminating non-tariff barriers (Muendler, 2003).  Finally, in 1991 India removed 
“licensing and other non-tariff barriers on all imports of intermediate and capital goods 
and [implemented] significant reductions in tariffs on imports” (Krishna and Mitra, 
1998).   
Table 1 summarizes a subset of the resulting studies, grouped by country-specific 
liberalization episode. For each episode, we summarize evidence on plant- or firm-level 
productivity gains and their relation to measures of trade protection  (column 4). Further, 
since productivity gains due to intra-plant innovations are conceptually distinct from 
those due to market share reallocations (including entry and exit), we cite evidence that 
isolates reallocation effects when it is available (column 5). Finally, to give some 
indication of whether competitive pressures intensified with trade liberalization, we cite 
studies that relate price-cost mark-ups to openness proxies in column 6. 
  5The message that emerges from Table 1 is consistently supportive of the import 
discipline hypothesis. Import-competing sectors generally undergo the biggest 
productivity gains during and immediately after trade liberalization episodes. These gains 
are due, in significant part, to reallocation effects. And they are generally accompanied 
by reductions in price-cost mark-ups, suggesting that heightened competitive pressure is 
the driving force behind the adjustments. 
 
C.  Limitations of the existing evidence 
Taken together, the studies in Table 1 constitute a valuable set of stylized facts 
concerning the effects of trade policy on industrial sector performance. Nonetheless, our 
ability to draw policy implications from this evidence is limited by problems with the 
performance measures that have been used, and by problems linking these measures to 
the policy regime. We now consider each in turn. 
Problems measuring performance  
One measurement problem derives from data limitations. It is infeasible to collect 
detailed information on the quantities of each of the different product varieties that firms 
produce. Thus all of the productivity studies in Table 1 measure output as deflated 
revenues. Similarly, although most of these studies measure labor inputs in terms of 
number of workers or hours worked, data limitations force them to measure intermediate 
inputs as deflated expenditures, and capital stocks as depreciated and depreciated 
expenditures. The resulting productivity measures therefore fall somewhere between 
revenue per unit cost, and revenue per unit input bundle.  
This feature of productivity measures would be a non-issue if outputs and 
intermediate input bundles were homogeneous across producers. But manufactured 
  6products are quite differentiated, even within narrowly defined industries, and price-cost 
mark-ups exhibit considerable variation across producers with product-specific demand 
conditions. In this setting, Katayama, et al (2003, hereafter KLT) note that firms with 
high mark-ups tend to generate lots of revenue per unit input bundle, and thus tend to 
appear relatively productive. Similarly, high ratios of revenues to measured input usage 
tend to occur at firms that pay dearly for their workers, since these firms pass some of 
their labor costs forward to consumers.  In contrast, when demand elasticities are 
common across firms, cross sectional variation in true productive efficiency has little to 
do with cross sectional variation in revenue per unit input bundle. The reason is that 
productivity shocks cause input usage and revenue to move up or down roughly in 
proportion to one another.
2  
This spurious cross-sectional variation in measured productivity matters 
especially in studies where the effects of reallocation-based productivity gains are 
calculated because big firms tend to pay their workers more, and to face relatively low 
demand elasticities.
3 Thus they tend to look relatively efficient, even if their true 
                                                 
2 KLT show that if the production technology is constant returns and Cobb-Douglas, measured productivity 
for the i
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it
t W is the industry-wide price deflator used for factor inputs, t P  is the 
industry-wide deflator used for sales revenues,  p
t W  is the appropriate industry-wide price index for factors 
measured in physical terms (most importantly, labor), W is the unobservable firm-specific unit price for 





reflects mark-ups and 
relative labor costs but it is independent of true productivity unless productivity affects mark-ups or the 
prices of factors measured in physical units. Even if the workers are paid more because they are more 
productive, the standard performance measures tell us nothing about economic efficiency because firms 
that use valuable inputs to produce valuable outputs need not be more efficient than firms that use cheap 
inputs to produce cheap output. 
 
3 Although it is somewhat tangential to our discussion, it is worth noting that this property of standard 
productivity measures probably also creates large biases in studies that compare productivity indices across 
multinationals, exporters and domestic producers. 
  7productivity is mediocre, and measured efficiency gains will be overstated when market 
shares shift in favor of these firms. Nonetheless, to the extent that big firms get big by 
being efficient, one can expect some cross-sectional correlation between measured 
efficiency and true efficiency, so measures of reallocation-based productivity gains are 
not entirely spurious. 
Time series variation in measured productivity is also likely to have a spurious 
component, albeit here again it should at least be correlated with true productivity 
growth. More precisely, if the cross-firm distribution of factor prices were time invariant, 
if the price deflators used were representative of the prices faced by the sample of 
producers being analyzed, and if firms could change their input usage without incurring 
adjustment costs, the average productivity measure would be a good proxy for average 
true productivity.
4 But mark-ups clearly tend fall with trade liberalization and this effect 
is particularly marked among large producers (Table 1, column 6). Thus, to the extent 
that this margin squeeze is most dramatic among import-competing firms, these studies 
may tend to understate efficiency gains in the import-competing industries during 
liberalization episodes. Measured productivity growth may also be understated in these 
industries because adjustment costs induce them to retain excess labor and capital during 
periods of slack demand. Both effects may help explain why the measured efficiency 
gains during the Brazilian, Chilean and the Mexico trade liberalizations were quite 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
4 Under the assumptions in footnote 1, this follows because profit maximization implies that the optimal 





ln − = φ µ , where  it W ln  is the log 
of the unobservable firm-specific deflator for a unit bundle of all inputs, regardless of whether they are 
measured in physical or expenditure terms. Substituting this expression into the expression for measured 
productivity in footnote 1 and averaging across firms yields the result that cross-firm mean values of 
measured productivities should be close to mean values of true productivity if the price deflators used are 
representative of the sample of firms. 
  8modest, despite major policy shocks and, at least in Chile, evidence of widespread labor 
shedding. 
The fact that manufactured products are differentiated across firms and through 
time creates another basic measurement problem for the studies in Table 1. Product 
innovations generally affect social welfare, but productivity studies only pick up temporal 
variation in process innovation. Thus, for example, firms that save on input usage by 
producing less appealing products are likely to look better than firms that keep their 
marginal costs constant but improve their products. With variation in both product quality 
and productive efficiency, firms’ performances should be measured in terms of their 
contributions to social surplus. Like the first problem, this one may be more important for 
cross-plant analyses than for time series, although changes in the set of available products 
probably matter over medium to long-term horizons. 
A final measurement problem is that the Table 1 studies tend to miss some costs 
that firms incur in order to become more productive. Because the data are usually 
unavailable, analysts are usually unable to include investments in R&D, worker training 
and other types of overhead in their studies. Similarly, when efficiency gains are 
accomplished through labor shedding, severance costs and the costs borne by displaced 
workers are generally not part of the calculations. By understating the costs of innovation 
and workforce downsizing, the typical study tends to treat productivity gains as 
unequivocally desirable, and may overstate the gains from import competition.  
Problems linking performance to the policy regime 
Even if firms’ performances had been appropriately measured, they would still 
leave some basic policy issues unresolved. One reason is that they are not very 
  9informative about the underlying behavior that generated the observed patterns of 
association between performance measures and openness proxies. For example, although 
we can be fairly confident that intra-firm efficiency is correlated through time with 
openness, we don’t know whether it reflects the changing nature of an agency problem, a 
shift in the return to innovation at owner-managed firms, or greater incentives to shed 
non-essential labor.  Nor do we know whether trade liberalization increases the incentives 
to absorb new embodied technologies through capital investments.
5 Answers to these 
questions determine whether the observed correlations are due to domestic market 
failuresin which case trade policy may not be the best way to address themor are 
inherently trade-related. 
Related issues arise in studies that measure reallocation-based productivity gains.  
Most simply report the amount of sectoral productivity growth that is not attributable to 
intra-plant productivity gains (Pacvnik, 2001; Liu, 1993; Tybout and Westbrook, 1995; 
Tybout, 1992). But without a dynamic structural model to interpret these figures, it is 
impossible to say how things might have differed under a more protectionist regime.
6 Do 
reallocation-based gains reflect an improvement in the efficiency of the weeding out 
process, or are they present because liberalization creates more plants that need weeding 
outperhaps by reducing the incentives to innovate? 
Finally, because the time periods covered by the studies in Table 1 are relatively 
brief, it is not clear whether this body of evidence describes transitory changes or long-
run adjustments. They might reflect a one-time shakedown, or they might reflect a lasting 
                                                 
5 Muendler (2003) does provide some evidence on the role of imported technologies in Brazil. 
 
  10change in industry dynamics. They might even describe short-run effects that are more 
than reversed over the medium to long term. 
 
III.  Interpreting the evidence with structural models 
Thus far we have argued that the existing empirical evidence on import discipline 
effects is noisy and biased, but three basic findings are probably qualitatively correct. 
Specifically, among import-competing firms, trade liberalization squeezes price-cost 
margins, induces some intra-plant efficiency gains, and induces additional efficiency 
gains due to the shutting down of weak plants. We have also argued that, measurement 
issues aside, these findings are of limited use for policy analysis. They do not tell us 
anything about the managerial behavior behind the intra-plant productivity gains, they do 
not go beyond short-run effects, and they do not link adjustment patterns to welfare. The 
remainder of this paper presents a calibrated model that does all of these things in a way 
that is consistent with the empirical evidence. 
 
A.  An Industrial Evolution Model with Import Discipline Effects 
If we are to interpret the existing evidence and draw policy implications, we 
require a structural model that captures several basic features. First, if we are to study 
intra-firm productivity change, the model should include the micro foundations for at 
least one form of induced innovation. Second, given that we believe the trade regime 
affects competitive pressures and mark-ups, the model should allow for imperfect 
competition. Third, if we are to study adjustment paths, the model should be explicitly 
                                                                                                                                                 
6 Muendler (2003) goes one step further by estimating exit probabilities for incumbent plants before versus 
after the Brazilian trade liberalization of the early 1990s. But this exercise does not explain entry or market 
  11dynamic, with forward-looking heterogeneous agents who foresee the future imperfectly. 
Fourth, given that we believe turnover-based productivity growth is significant, the 
model should allow for endogenous entry and market share reallocations. And finally, if 
we are to study the net welfare effects of changes in behavior, the model should assign 
some costs to entry and innovation.  
Needless to say, the modeling exercise we have described above is a difficult one. 
But if we forego econometric analysis and content ourselves with calibration, it is 
possible to construct a computable model with all of these features, and thereby to 
develop a broad sense for some of the dynamic structural relationships that are consistent 
with the stylized facts of Table 1. In the remainder of this section we demonstrate how 
this might be done, and we use the results to inform our interpretation of the econometric 
evidence. To keep the analysis tractable we study a hypothetical industry populated by a 
handful of firms that differ only in terms of the quality of their products.  
The Ericson-Pakes-McGuire Model 
We base our analysis closely on the industrial evolution model developed by 
Ericson and Pakes (1995) and simulated by Pakes and McGuire (1994 and 2001). The 
basic assumptions behind the simulated version of this model are concisely summarized 
in Pakes (2001) and Pakes and McGuire (2001), which we now paraphrase.  
The PEM model describes the evolution of an industry populated by a changing 
set of firms, each producing a single differentiated product. Factor prices and the price of 
an outside goodfor present purposes, a composite imported goodare exogenous. 
Product quality varies across firms and through time. The current-period pay-off to an 
                                                                                                                                                 
share reallocations, and it fails to identify the deep parameters needed for counter-factual analysis. 
  12active firm with product quality level i is determined by a profit function  ) , ( s i π , where 
, the set of positive integers, and  + Ζ ∈ i [ ] + ∈ = Z j s s
j ;  is a vector whose j
th element 
gives the number of active firms at quality level j.
7  Given s, incumbents with product 
quality i decide whether to remain active or exit and sell their firm for a scrap value φ .  
Those that remain active also choose an investment level x, which costs them cx and 
shifts the probability distribution for their next-period quality realization. Larger x 
investments lead to more favorable shifts. 
For a firm currently at quality i, investing x in product development, and 
operating in a market with structure s, let  ) , , | , ( s i x s i p ′ ′  be the perceived probability 
distribution for next period’s market structure. Then, given a discount factor of β , such a 
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If the max operator returns φ , it is optimal for the entrepreneur to sell the firm for scrap, 
otherwise it chooses the investment level x that maximizes the term in square brackets 
and proceeds to compete in the product market. 
  It is convenient to treat the quality index i as normalized relative to current quality 
of the imported good. Then if i grows through time, firms at this quality level must be 
investing more than enough in innovation to keep up with the quality of the imported good. 
More precisely, let the Bernoulli random variables  t ν  and  t ζ  represent increments to own 
                                                 
7 Given investment decisions, future realizations on (i,s) are presumed not to depend upon firms’ current 
pricing or output decisions. Thus the profit function reflects a simple “spot market” equilibrium in the 
goods markets and, for example, punishment strategies are disallowed. 
  13and foreign quality, respectively, and assume that it evolves according to: 
t t t t i i ζ ν − = − +1 .  Shocks to the quality of the imported good,  t ζ , are exogenous draws 
that take on the value one with probability δ µ = ) 1 ( , where 0 1 < δ <  is a constant. Shocks 
to the quality of a domestic good depend upon the firm’s investment current investment: 




, where a > 0 is a constant. Thus for a firm investing  , the 
expected gain in quality relative to the imported good is 
t x
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To further characterize the transition kernel,  (i p , let  describes the 
states of the competitors of a firm at state i when the industry structure is s, and let 
 describes this firm’s beliefs about the probability of landing at market 
structure s next period, given the current state and  t ζ . Then the transition probabilities 
that enter the value function (1) are: 
 
) ) | ( ) , , | * ν
ζ
∑ = = = ′ q x p s i x s ,  
  
where e(i) is a compatible vector with zeros everywhere except in the i
th position, which 
holds a one. Note that  ) , , | ˆ ( ζ s i si q embodies firm i’s beliefs about entry behavior and the 
value functions of all competing incumbents. 
Finally, there is at most one entrant per period, and this entrepreneur creates a 
firm if doing so generates an expected discounted cash flow that exceeds the entry cost, 
xe. Any potential entrant for whom this condition holds pays xe (drawn from a uniform 
distribution), and after a set-up period becomes an incumbent with an initial relative 
quality i .  Note that   measures quality relative to imported good, so this specification  e e i
  14means that entrants always jump into the market the same expected distance from the 
foreign best practice frontier, so it amounts to the assumption that foreign technological 
innovations are always embodied in the capital stocks of new firms, up to a constant gap. 
Equilibria obtain when all firms’ beliefs,  ) , , | ˆ ( ζ s i s q i , are consistent with the 
objective distribution of industry structures based on the investment, entry and exit rules 
described above.  Pakes and Erikson (1995) show that Markov-perfect equilibria exist, 
although uniqueness is not ensured. Also, although the industry exhibits ongoing entry 
and exit, the number of firms is bounded by some integer n , and each active firm is 
limited to a finite integer set of states,  { } K , , 1K = Ω .  Thus one need only compute 
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  Our adaptation of the model 
We base firms’ profit functions on pure Bertrand competition in product markets 
characterized by a nested-logit demand system (McFadden, 1974). Nest 0 contains only 
the composite imported variety, and nest 1 contains all of the domestic varieties. More 
precisely, we define the net utility that the j
th consumer derives from consuming a unit of 
product i at price  in period t to be:  it P
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measures the mean gross utility delivered by a unit of the current generation imported 
0 ) ( < ⋅ ′ ′ g
  15variety, and  ) ( t it i f = ω  measures the mean extra utility delivered by a unit of any 
domestic good at quality level it.
 8  Also,  0 > θ  measures price sensitivity, and ϕ  
measures the degree of substitution between domestic varieties and the imported good 
(1 0 < <ϕ ). The latter follows because  t d j, ξ varies only across individuals and across 
nests (d=1 for domestic varieties and 0 for imports), while  ijt ε  varies across individuals 
and across all varieties. (Both  ijt t d j ε ϕ ξ ) 1 ( , − +  and ij ε  have extreme value distributions 
across individuals.)  This allows us to control the degree of substitution between imports 
and the domestic varieties.
9 
                                                 
) 1 /( − + i i
Given our utility function, improvements in the quality of the imported good and 
reductions in its price have very similar effects from the perspective of consumers. Thus 
ongoing quality improvements abroad can also be viewed as ongoing price reductions, 
perhaps due to exchange rate appreciation. Similar comments apply concerning the 
domestic goods. Marginal cost reductions always lead to price reductions in our 
characterization of the spot market equilibrium. So, although we assume that the 
domestic firms have identical, flat marginal cost schedules, roughly speaking we may 
view the effects of product innovations as similar to the effects of process innovation.  
 
 
8 We use f(i) = 15 .  (We do not need to make specific assumptions about   to solve the 
model, since it only affects the level of consumer surplus.) Note that our specification for f(⋅) implies 
diminishing marginal utility from quality premiums. Also, it ensures that the return to quality 
improvements (relative to the imported good) approaches zero as i→ ∞, and thus eliminates the incentive 
for firms to drive i above the maximum value considered, K. 
5 ) (⋅ g
 
9 Berry (1994) provides further details on the product market equilibria that obtain with nested logit 
demands and pure Bertrand pricing rules. 
 
  16B.  The Simulation Exercises 
Using modified versions of the Gauss and C programs written by Ariel Pakes, 
Paul McGuire and Gautam Gowrisankaran, we study the effects of import competition on 
industrial structure using two policy experiments. The first is to permanently reduce the 
price of the composite imported good,   (hereafter, the “RPM experiment”). It is meant 
to approximate a reduction in trade barriers. The second is to permanently accelerate the 
rate of innovation for imported goods, 
0 P
δ  (hereafter, the AIM experiment). It is meant to 
describe the effects of trading with a country where technological progress is rapid, as 
opposed to modest.  
Both sets of exercises begin from a parameterization in which imports have a very 
small market share. Also, we assume that no more than six domestic firms are 
simultaneously active in the domestic market. (This bound is rarely hit under the 
parameterizations we usethree to five firms are typically active.) Thus we caution that 
the results may overstate the importance of oligopolistic interactions for most 
manufacturing industries.  
To eliminate any role for starting values, we begin each simulation with 5,000 
periods under the pre-reform parameterization, then we shock the parameter of interest 
and track the industry’s adjustment. The shock is always presumed to surprise 
entrepreneurs, but once in place the new parameter values are presumed to be common 
knowledge. Each experiment is repeated 100 times, and the average trajectories are 
graphed. Our graphs are normalized so that the regime change takes place in period 50, 
and thereafter they show both the simulated responses and the mean trajectory that would 
  17have emerged in the absence of the regime switch. The parameter values we use for these 
simulations are presented in Table 2. 
It is not possible to be precise about the length of time that corresponds to a single 
period. But the typical life span of a firm in our simulations is 4 to 6 periods, so an 
average life span of 10 years implies that one period amounts to roughly 2 years. 
Similarly, we note that the average entry/exit rate in our base case simulations is 23 
percent, which is roughly twice the annual rate observed among manufacturing plants in 
semi-industrialized countries (Roberts and Tybout, 1996).   
Reduced Price for Imports (RPM) 
Our results for a permanent reduction in the price of importsthe RPM 
experimentare summarized by figures 1.1 through 1.8 and the first two columns of 
Table 3. Consider first the domestic market share trajectories presented in figure 1.1. 
When the price of the imported good drops from 1.5 to 0, the share of output supplied by 
domestic firms immediately drops as consumers shift toward the import variety. The 
price-cost mark-ups of domestic varieties also drop as domestic entrepreneurs react to the 
new environment (figure 1.5).  
The net exit rate is roughly 10 percent in the first post-reform period, and all of 
the disappearing firms come from the low end of the product quality distribution. Thus 
the unweighted average quality of domestic goods rises sharply in the immediate 
aftermath of the reform (figure 1.2). (The weighted average relative quality of domestic 
goods doesn’t change much initially because exiting firms are smallsee figure 1.3.) But 
incentives to innovate are clearly less at the lower imported price, reflecting a simple 
Schumpeterian mechanism: firms with the most market power gain the most from R&D 
  18(figure 1.4).
10 Consequently, average quality/efficiency begins a sustained downward 
trend after 4 or 5 periods. One implication is that short-run analyses of the efficiency 
effects of trade liberalization may be quite misleading. 
Workers are unlikely to like the new regime because it discourages investments in 
product improvements, thereby reducing firms’ average live spans (Table 3) and 
increasing rates of job turnover. On the other hand, consumers are clearly better off, 
especially during the early periods (figure 1.8). This is because the prices of domestic and 
foreign goods are lower after the reform (figure 1.5), the decline in the relative quality of 
domestic goods hasn’t really gotten started (figures 1.2 and 1.3), and the domestic 
varieties that exit weren’t contributing much to their welfare. Consumers’ enthusiasm for 
the new regime fades as the relative quality of domestic products declines, and the prices 
of these goods come back up a bit. But overall, the reform generates a 22 percent increase 
in the present value of their surplus (Table 3).
11 
Finally, domestic producers suffer capital losses when the regime hits, and they 
remain worse off under the new regime because their mark-ups are smaller (figure 1.7). 
Overall, the present value of their surplus is reduced by 11 percent. Nonetheless, social 
welfare is dominated by consumer surplus, which increases in present value by 21 
percent (Table 3).  
Of course, other assumptions might have led to different patterns of response, and 
we could certainly refine our calibration, but it is noteworthy that our simulations match 
                                                 
10 Rodrik (1992) flags this effect as a possible reaction to heightened import competition. In our model it is 
conceivable that a small reduction in the price of imports might drive a marginal firm from the market, 
thereby increasing the return to innovation for the remaining producers. However, this phenomenon is 
clearly not typical of our simulations. 
 
  19up well to most of the econometric evidence. That is, import competition induces smaller 
firms, lower mark-ups, and a cleansing effect that helps to sustain efficiency.  The only 
seeming incongruity is that efficiency gains in the RPM experiment come exclusively 
from firm turnover and market share reallocations in our simulations, while the studies in 
Table 1 find significant intra-firm productivity gains. However, one can reconcile this 
experiment with the evidence by simply thinking of entry and exit as corresponding to 
product lines rather than plants. Then the same plant might continue to exist as it retools 
for a new product, and thus might exhibit short run intra-plant efficiency gains. This 
interpretation is consistent with evidence on the Chilean experience, where plants 
improved their efficiency by shedding labor rather than expanding output with a given 
labor force (e.g., Tybout, 1996). It is also consistent with the common finding that, while 
manufacturing productivity improves after trade liberalization, unemployment increases 
economy-wide, and therefore aggregate productivity growth is modest. 
Accelerated innovation among imports (AIM) 
  An alternative form of opening occurs when domestic firms are faced with 
accelerated innovation among the imported goods. We think of this type of shock as 
approximating policies that bring dynamic new trading partners into play and/or policies 
that remove non-tariff barriers on products that are subject to relatively rapid 
technological change. It might also approximate policies that lead to extended periods of 
real exchange rate appreciation, although it is difficult to imagine this occurring 
indefinitely without macro crises emerging. The simulated responses to such a regime 
change are graphed in figures 2.1 through 2.8, which contrast behavior when  =0.6 with  δ
                                                                                                                                                 
) (
11 Given that we have held the rate of innovation among imported goods fixed, consumer preferences for 
the open regime don’t depend upon what functional form we choose for .    ⋅ g
  20behavior when  =0.8. (Recall that  δ δ  is the exogenous probability of an improvement in 
the quality of imported goods.) 
  Figure 2.1 shows that domestic firms lose no market share in the face of this type 
of competitive pressure. The reason is that they reduce their prices enough to compensate 
for the reduction in their relative quality once new regime begins to take hold (figure 
2.5). They do, however, gradually lose relative quality (figures 2.2 and 2.3, lower line) as 
improvements among imported goods cumulate and they increasingly scale back their 
own investments (figure 2.4). The gradual decline in domestic investment mirrors the 
gradual fall in domestic mark-ups, once again reflecting a Shumpeterian reduction in the 
incentive to innovate.  
Our post-reform series on relative efficiency are a bit misleading because, when 
the rate of innovation among imported goods increases, the yardstick for performance of 
the domestic varieties increases too. Thereafter domestic producers must improve their 
quality index by 0.8 per period rather than 0.6 per period simply in order to keep up. So 
although relative quality trends downward for 40 periods after the AIM regime is 
implemented, the per-period change in the level of domestic quality actually increases. 
We demonstrate this with an extra trajectory in figures 2.2 and 2.3 (top line) that shows 
the quality of the domestic goods relative to a hypothetical reference good that continues 
to improve by 0.6 per period after the reform is implemented. This scenario is therefore 
consistent with the stylized fact that intra-firm efficiency gains accelerate after 
liberalization episodes. 
  That domestic producers are able to increase the rate of improvement in their 
goods reflects two forces. First, the mean life span of firms drops 23 percent when δ  
  21increases from 0.6 to 0.8 (Table 3). Second, after the regime switch, new firms are able to 
embody rapidly improving global best practice technologies in their plants at no 
additional expense. Thus, although firms invest less in keeping up with import 
innovations, each is more quickly replaced by an entrant near the technology frontier.
12 
This type of induced innovation provides some micro foundations for the common 
finding that countries with high-tech trading partners enjoy relatively rapid growth (Coe 
and Helpman, 1995). 
The AIM shock immediately improves producer surplus because domestic firms 
don’t lose much relative quality initially, and they spend less of their gross revenue on 
investment (figure 2.7). However, the cost savings from reduced investments are 
gradually swamped by the revenue losses induced by persistently higher rates of quality 
improvements among imports. 
How do consumers fare? Figure 2.8 suggests that they to do worse than they did 
under the RPM experiment because the relative quality of imported goods has fallen. 
However, this figure is drawn under the extreme assumption that consumers only care 
about the variety of goods available and their relative quality, and not about the average 
level of quality. (That is,  0 ) ( 0 = ′ t g ω .) If we had allowed  ) ( 0t g ω to grow with 
improvements in the quality of imports, we could easily have demonstrated large 
consumer gains due to the more rapid rate of quality improvement among both domestic 
and imported goods. The interested reader may choose his favorite g( ) specification and 
perform this exercise for himself. 
                                                 
12 If new firms were allowed to endogenously invest in order to influence their initial product quality, the 
AIM shock would increase entrants’ initial investments and thus increase their relative size. That is, given 
the choice, entrepreneurs adjust by shifting their investments away from post-entry expenditures toward 
  22 
 
IV.  Summary and Conclusions 
The existing literature on industrial responses to trade liberalization documents 
consistent patterns of correlation between openness proxies and several measures of 
performance: price-cost mark-ups, intra-plant productivity gains, and reallocation-based 
productivity gains. These stylized facts are useful, but they don’t tell us much about the 
underlying behavior of producers, nor do they link firms’ performances to welfare 
measures, so they are of limited use for policy analysis. We have sketched an alternative 
approach to the analysis of trade liberalization that does both, and we have demonstrated 
this approach using fabricated data. 
Lessons from the simulation exercises 
Although our simulations are not calibrated to actual data, they make several 
basic points. First, when outward-oriented trade reforms reduce price-cost mark-ups, the 
less successful producers are likely to shut down or eliminate some product lines. This 
one-time adjustment in the set of firms and products is a quick source of efficiency gains, 
particularly when the new policy regime involves a sudden, significant departure from 
the previous environment. But it dissipates after 5 or 6 periods (10 to 12 years). Thus 
panel-based econometric studies of liberalization-based productivity gainswhich 
typically span a decade, or lessare probably not representative of longer term effects.   
Second, the same forces that induce exit tend to discourage innovation, so after 
liberalization, the quality of domestic products may well decline relative to imports. This 
                                                                                                                                                 
pre-entry expenditures. Experiments that demonstrate this reaction are available from the authors upon 
request. 
  23effect is gradual, but in our simulations it eventually swamps the efficiency-enhancing 
effects of the initial wave of exits. In principle, other characterizations of market 
equilibria might have led to different conclusions concerning the effects of foreign 
competition on domestic innovationBoone (2000) and Aghion et al (2002) provide 
some examples. But we found it difficult to identify plausible specifications that reverse 
this finding. 
Third, falling behind in relative quality need not lead to deceleration in the 
absolute rate of innovation. Deceleration is less likely if trade liberalization increases the 
rate at which embodied technologies become available through capital goods imports. 
The more rapid these arrivals, the better new entrants are positioned to produce near the 
technological frontier.  
Fourth, plant and job turnover rates are likely to be permanently higher after 
liberalization. This effect is particularly marked when the reforms allow new, embodied 
technologies arrive to arrive relatively rapidly through capital goods imports. Such an 
environment creates ongoing incentives to introduce new plants or assembly lines, rather 
than continually to upgrade existing facilities. The resultant higher turnover works to the 
detriment of labor, which is more frequently displaced.
13 
Fifth, although all of our figures represent averages over 100 trajectories, they still 
reflect a large role for idiosyncratic shocks. Thus the consequences of policy reforms may 
                                                 
13Heightened foreign competition may have had this effect in India. A recent study of India’s post-
liberalization period finds that “firms subject to external exposure . . . face higher earnings variability and 
job insecurity. At the same time, though, the employees of foreign owned and import-competing firms are 
more frequently involved in training programs than firms not subject to foreign competition.” (Daveri et al, 
2002).. Similarly, Levinsohn (1999) finds that tradeable goods sectors exhibited relatively high job 
turnover rates in post-liberalization Chile. 
  24remain obscured by noise for substantial periods of time, particularly when one is 
studying variables that respond to expectations like investment, entry and exit.  
 
Future directions 
There are at least two important limitations to the strategy we have demonstrated 
in this paper. The first is that it involves many modeling assumptions. We would 
naturally prefer to avoid using so much structure, but we do not believe it is possible to 
perform welfare-based policy analysis without it. Our view is: if the calibrated models 
generate patterns of turnover, pricing and efficiency gains that match observed patterns, 
they simply provide a coherent interpretation for observed experiences. One of our 
objectives is develop enough experience with computable industrial evolution models 
that we have a good sense for the practical importance of the various modeling 
assumptions.  
The second limitation of our approach to analysis is that it is computationally 
intensive. The solution algorithms currently available for PEM models handle about a 
dozen firms, at most, and can take hours to solve for value functions at a given set of 
parameter values. Thus they can be calibrated to small industries using actual data on 
market shares, turnover patterns, prices and efficiency gains, but they are unlikely to 
serve as a basis for econometric estimation of all parameters. (Entry costs and scrap 
values are particularly difficult to identify.) We are currently exploring alternative 
solution algorithms that will allow us to handle more firms, and we are attempting to 
calibrate PEM-type models more tightly to actual liberalization experiences. 
  25Bibliography 
 
Aghion, Philippe, Nicolas Bloom, Richard Blundell, Rachel Griffith and Peter Howitt, 
“Competition and Innovation: An Inverted-U Relationship,” Department of 
Economics, Harvard University, September 2002. 
 
Aghion, Philippe, Robin Burgess, Stephen Redding, and Fabricio Zilibotti, “The Unequal 
Effects of Liberalization: Theory and Evidence from India,” Department of 
Economics, Harvard University, March 2003. 
 
Bernard, Andrew, Jonathan Eaton, J. Bradford Jensen and Samuel Kortum, “Plants and 
Productivity in International Trade,” American Econmic Review, forthcoming.  
 
Berry, Steven, “Estimating Discrete-Choice Models of Product Differentiation,” RAND 
Journal Vol. 25(2) (1994), pp. 242-262. 
 
Berry, Steven, James Levinsohn, and Ariel Pakes, “Voluntary Export Restraints on 
Automobiles: Evaluating a Trade Policy,” American Economic Review Vol. 89, 
No. 3 (June, 1999), pp. 400-430. 
 
Boone, Jan, “Competitive Pressure: the Effects on Investments in Product and Process 
Innovation,” RAND Journal of Economics Vol. 31, No. 3 (Autumn, 2000), pp. 
549-569. 
 
Coe, David and Elhanan Helpman, “International R&D Spillovers,” European Economic 
Review, (1995), pp. 859-887. 
 
De Melo, Jaime and Shujiro Urata, “The Influence of Increased Foreign Competition on 
Industrial Concentration and Profitability,” International Journal of Industrial 
Organization, Vol. 4 (1986), pp. 287-304. 
 
Ericson, Richard, and Ariel Pakes, “Markov-Perfect Industry Dynamics: A Framework 
for Empirical Work, Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 62 (1995), pp. 53-82. 
 
Daveri, Franceso, Paolo Manasse and Danila Serra. “The Twin Effects of Globalization,” 
Centro Studi Luca d’Agliano, Development Studies Working Paper No. 171, 
November 2002. 
 
Goldberg, Pinelopi. “Product Differentiation and Oligopoly in International Markets: The 
Case of the U.S. Automobile Industry.” Econometrica, July 1995, Vol. 63, No. 4, 
pp. 891-952. 
 
Grether, Jean-Marie, “Mexico: 1985-90: Trade Liberalization, Market Structure and 
Manufacturing Performance", in Mark Roberts, and James Tybout (eds.), 
Industrial Evolution in Developing Countries, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1996. 
  26 
Grossman, Gene and Elhanan Helpman, Innovation and Growth in the Global Economy, 
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1991. 
 
Harrison, Ann, “Productivity, Imperfect Competition and Trade Reform: Theory and 
Evidence, Journal of International Economics 36 (1994), pp. 53-73 
 
Harrison, Ann, "Determinants and Effects of Direct Foreign Investment in Cote d'Ivoire, 
Morocco, and Venezuela", in Mark Roberts, and James Tybout (eds.), Industrial 
Evolution in Developing Countries, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996. 
 
Hart, Oliver, “The Market Mechanism as an Incentive Scheme,” Bell Journal of 
Economics, Vol. 14 (1983), pp. 366-382. 
 
Hay, Donald “The Post-1990 Brazilian Trade Liberalization and the Performance of 
Large Manufacturing Firms: Productivity, Market Share and Profits,” The 
Economic Journal Vol. 111 (2001), pp. 620-41. 
 
Katayama, Hajime, Shihua Lu and James Tybout, “Why Plant-Level Productivity Studies 
are Often Misleading, and an Alternative Approach to Inference,” NBER 
Working Paper No. 9617, 2003. 
 
Krishna, Pravin and Devashish Mitra, “Trade Liberalization, Market Discipline and 
Productivity Growth: New Evidence from India, Journal of Development 
Economics Vol. 56 (1998), pp. 447-462. 
 
Levinsohn, James, “Employment Responses to International Liberalization in Chile,” 
Journal of International Economics Vol. 47 (April 1999), pp. 321-344. 
 
Liu, Lili, “Entry-Exit, Learning and Productivity Change: Evidence from Chile,” Journal 
of Development Economics, Vol. 42 (1993), pp., 217-42. 
 
Martin, S., “Endogenous Firm Efficiency in a Cournot Principal-Agent Model,” Journal 
of Economic Theory, Vol. 59 (1993), pp. 445-450. 
 
McFadden, Daniel, “Conditional Logit Analysis of Qualitative Choice Behavior,” in Paul 
Zarembka, ed., Frontiers in Econometrics. New York: Academic Press, 1974. 
 
Melitz, Marc, "The Impact of Trade on Intra-Industry Reallocations and Aggregate 
Productivity," Econometrica, forthcoming. 
 
Muendler, Marc, “Trade, Technology, and Productivity: A Study of Brazilian 
Manufacturers, 1986-1998, Department of Economics, University of California at 
San Diego, 2002. 
 
  27Pakes, Ariel and Paul McGuire, “Computing Mark-Perfect Nash Equilibria: Numerical 
Implications of a Dynamic Differentiated Product Model,” RAND Journal of 
Economics, Vol. 25, No. 4 (Winter 1994), pp. 555-589. 
 
Pakes, Ariel and Paul McGuire, “Stochastic Algorithms, Symmetric Markov Perfect 
Equilbrium, and the ‘Curse’ of Dimensionality,” Econometrica, Vol. 69, No. 5 
(September 2001), pp. 1261-1282. 
 
Pavcnik, Nina, “Trade Liberalization, Exit and Productivity Improvements: Evidence 
from Chilean Plants,” Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 69 (2002), pp. 245-276. 
 
Roberts, Mark and James Tybout, Industrial Evolution in Developing Countries, New 
York: Oxford University Press for the World Bank, 1996. 
 
Rodrik, Dani, “Closing the Technology Gap: Does Trade Liberalization Really Help?” in 
Gerald Helleiner, ed., Trade Policy, Industrialization and Development: New 
Perspectives, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992. 
 
Scharfstein, D., “Product Market Competition and Managerial Slack,” RAND Journal of 
Economics Vol. 19 (1988), pp. 549-569. 
 
Tybout, James, “Linking Trade and Productivity: New Research Directions,” World Bank 
Economic Review, Vol. 6, No. 2 (1992), pp. 189-211. 
 
Tybout, James, Jaime de Melo and Vittorio Corbo, “The Effects of Trade Reforms on 
Scale and Technical Efficiency,” Journal of International Economics, Vol. 31 
(1991), pp. 231-50. 
 
Tybout, James and M. Daniel Westbrook, “Trade Liberalization and the Dimensions of 
Efficiency Change in Mexican Manufacturing Industries,” Journal of 
International Economics, Vol. 39 (1991), pp. 53-78. 
 
Tybout, James, “Chile 1979-86: Trade Liberalization and its Aftermath,” in Mark 
Roberts, and James Tybout (eds.), Industrial Evolution in Developing Countries, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996. 
 
Vousten, Neil and Neil Campbell, “The Organizational Cost of Protection,” Journal of 
International Economics, Vol. 37 (1994), pp. 219-38. 
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DeMelo and 
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Price-cost margin  Import 
penetration rate 
       Post-reform  penetration of
imports reduced mark-ups 
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trated sectors. 
Tybout et al 
(1991) 
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large reductions in 
protection exhibit the 
largest gains 
  
Tybout* (1996)  Price-cost margin  Import 
penetration rate 
       Margins  are negatively
affected by import 
penetration, especially 
among large plants. 
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Muendler (2003)  Olley-Pakes (1996) 
estimates of TFP 
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other forms of market 
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  Operating profits are 
positively associated with 
nominal protection rates. 









Sectors with most 
exposure to import 
competition showed 
the most gain 
  





       Big  firms  undergoing the
most reduction in 
protection show the 
biggest reduction in 
margins 
India, 1991-97         
Krishna and Mitra 
(1998) 
Hall (1988)-type 
estimates of TFP 






      Significant  reductions in
mark-ups after trade 
liberalization 
Cote d’Ivoire           
Harrison (1994)  Hall (1988)-type 
estimates of TFP 
residuals and mark-ups 
      Productivity growth
tripled after trade 
liberalization 
  Weak evidence that price-
cost margins fell with 
trade liberalization 
Harrison (1996)  Production function-
based TFP residuals; 
price-cost margins 
Tariff rates, 
controlling for FDI 
in plants, sector 
High tariffs are 
negatively associated 
with productivity, 
controlling for FDI 
  High tariffs are associated 
with high margins and low 
productivity. 
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Table 2: Parameter Values for Policy Experiments 
 
Parameters 
Reduced Price for 
Imports (RPM) 
Accelerated Innovation 
for Imports (AIM) 
Marginal costs of production (domestic firms)  1  1 
Market Size (M)  10  10 
Discount factor (β )  0.925    0.925
Scrap Value (φ )  0.1   
   
0.1
Max Efficiency ( )  max i 21 21
Investment efficiency (a)  2  2 
Price sensitivity of consumers ( ) θ   5    5
Degree of substitution between nests (σ ) 
P
0.5    0.5
Price of the imported good ( )  0 1.5 to 0  1.5 
Probability of Innovation in the Imported good  (δ )  0.6  0.6 to 0.8 
 
 
Table 3: Summary Statistics for RPM and AIM regimes* 
  
 Base case    





0 P =1.5, 
6 . 0 = δ  
0 . 0 = P0 , 
6 . 0 = δ  
0 P =1.5 
8 . 0 = δ  
Percentage of periods with entry and exit*  55.8  57.8  72.1 
Mean number of firms active*  3.8  3.6  2.9 
Mean lifespan*  5.3  5.0  4.2 
      
Mean consumer surplus**  855.3  1045.9  686.5*** 
Mean producer surplus**  27.9  25.0  30.1 
Mean total surplus**  882.8  1072.0  716.6*** 
 
*    Means taken across 100 trajectories of 5,000 periods each 
    **  Means taken across 100 trajectories of 100 periods each, discounted back to initial year of regime 
***Excludes gains due to more rapid growth in the average quality of goods. 
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 Figure 2.5:
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